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AN INSIDE SCOOP ON SCOPES: 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAWS AND POLICIES GOVERNING 
THE SCOPES OF TRADE REMEDY ORDERS 
By Scott D. McBride* 
ABSTRACT 
The globalization of supply and processing chains has led to an 
increase in the complexity of international trade laws and the necessity for the 
United States Department of Commerce to provide clarity in the enforcement 
of trade remedy orders and procedures. It is therefore no surprise that over the 
past few years, Commerce has experienced a surge in requests for rulings on 
whether or not certain imported products are covered by the scope of 
antidumping and countervailing duty orders. Furthermore, Commerce has 
conducted several inquiries to determine if imported products which are 
outside the scope of an antidumping or countervailing duty order are, in fact, 
circumventing those orders through such means as third country processing 
or minor alterations. These proceedings have brought to light how important 
it is for domestic producers, injured by dumped or subsidized merchandise 
and filing a petition for a trade remedy investigation, to propose definitions of 
the scopes of their suggested orders that are clear, administrable, and prevent 
the possibility of evasion. This paper on the “Inside Scoop on Scopes” is a 
timely overview of the various laws and policies covering Commerce’s 
definition of the scopes of its trade remedy orders, its subsequent 
interpretation of those scopes, and its expansion of those scopes through 
circumvention determinations, when necessary. Furthermore, it addresses 
key holdings by the Court of International Trade and the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit with respect to these types of proceedings. 
 
 
* Scott D. McBride is an Assistant Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and 
Compliance at the United States Department of Commerce, but the views expressed 
in this paper are his alone, and not that of the government. Scott has over 19 years’ 
experience administering and litigating AD and CVD laws before United States 
Federal Courts, North American Free Trade Agreement Panels, and the World Trade 
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Natalie Zink, Ian McInerney, and Saad Chalchal for their assistance in getting Scott’s 
pen to paper. Most of all, Scott would like to thank his wife Jennifer, and children 
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paper. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is nothing more fundamental to antidumping (AD) and 
countervailing duty (CVD) laws than the AD and CVD Orders 
themselves. Following an AD and/or CVD investigation, in which the 
United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) has found 
imported merchandise to be sold for less than fair value and/or 
unfairly subsidized,1 and the International Trade Commission (ITC) 
has determined that an industry is materially injured or threatened 
with material injury in the United States by sales of that merchandise, 
Commerce is directed by statute to issue an AD and/or CVD Order.2 
The “general rule” with respect to an AD determination is that if a 
“class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in 
the United States at less than its fair value” and is found to be causing 
(or threatening) material injury, “then there shall be imposed upon 
such merchandise an antidumping duty . . . .”3 Likewise, in the context 
of an affirmative CVD determination finding the existence of a 
“countervailable subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, 
or export of a class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely 
to be sold) for importation, into the United States,” the statute says 
“there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a countervailing duty 
. . . .”4 
Accordingly, perhaps the most important factor in drafting an 
AD or CVD Order is making certain that the description of the “class 
or kind of foreign merchandise” covered by that Order is sufficiently 
specific – covering the merchandise which was found to be “dumped” 
in the United States market or unfairly subsidized, as well as causing 
material injury to a domestic industry. It is important that the Order 
covers the breadth of products that were intended to be covered but is 
not so broad that it covers products unrelated to the merchandise 
subject to the underlying investigation. In the lexicon of trade 
remedies, we call that description of merchandise subject to an AD or 
CVD Order the “scope” of the Order. 
 
1 Final Determinations, 19 U.S.C. § 1673d. 
2 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(2); Final Determinations, 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(c)(2). 
3 Imposition of antidumping duties, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (emphasis added). 
4 Countervailing duties imposed, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (emphasis added). 
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There are in fact three different, well-established proceedings 
in the AD and CVD laws which pertain to the scope of an Order. The 
first occurs during an AD or CVD investigation and is the procedure 
in which Commerce defines the scope, with some possible 
modifications implemented as a result of the ITC’s final injury 
determination. The second arises after the AD or CVD Order has been 
issued and an interested party wants Commerce to determine if a 
product is covered by the Order. The third takes center stage when a 
product appears to be outside the scope of an Order, but a domestic 
industry alleges that a respondent is circumventing the order. 
Thereafter, Commerce is required to consider whether the product is 
truly outside the scope, and if so, to determine if certain factors exist 
to nonetheless draw the product under the umbrella of the Order 
through a circumvention determination. This paper will attempt to 
shed some light on each of these areas of law,5 and the procedures 
unique to each,6 while highlighting some legal issues which have been 
addressed in the past by the Court of International Trade (“CIT”) and 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit). 
 
5 There are certain outstanding legal and policy issues not addressed in this article, but 
it is the author’s hope that one can use this paper as a gateway to understand some of 
the more fundamental issues and concepts covering scope matters before Commerce. 
6 There is a relatively new fourth area of law which pertains to Commerce’s scopes, 
not covered by this paper. On February 24, 2016, the Trade Facilitation and Trade 
Enforcement Act of 2015 was signed into law, which contains Title IV – Prevention 
of Evasion of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders (short title “Enforce and 
Protect Act of 2015,” or “EAPA”). Pub. L. No. 114-125, 130 Stat. 122, 155 (2016). 
The EAPA added section 19 U.S.C. §1517, which provides a means by which an 
interested party can request that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) investigate 
potential evasion of AD and CVD Orders, and if CBP is unable to determine whether 
the merchandise at issue is “covered merchandise,” pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 
§1517(b)(4)(a), it refers the matter to Commerce to make a covered merchandise 
determination. Commerce has not yet issued regulations pursuant to this new area of 
law, and has received a limited number of EAPA referrals to date. Accordingly, there 
is little to reference or analyze with respect to this area of law, unlike the other three 
areas discussed in this paper, as it is just in its nascent stage. 
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II. DEFINING THE SCOPE 
A. Commerce is Owed Significant Deference in Defining 
the Scope 
In every investigation, the scope of the merchandise being 
investigated is initially set forth in the Petition filed by the allegedly 
aggrieved domestic industry (petitioners) requesting the initiation of 
an investigation. In general, as the CIT has recognized, Commerce 
owes a great deal of deference to the petitioners in defining the scope 
because they are experts in their industries and, as the allegedly 
aggrieved parties, have personal knowledge of the imported products 
causing harm.7 
However, Commerce may modify, amend, or otherwise 
change the scope of merchandise being investigated for various 
reasons.8 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit has held that Commerce is 
tasked by statute with the “responsibility to determine the proper 
scope” of an “investigation and of the antidumping order.”9 As the 
Federal Circuit has explained, an “antidumping investigation is 
typically initiated by a petition filed by a domestic industry requesting 
that Commerce conduct an investigation into possible dumping” and 
the “petition initially determines the scope of the investigation,” but 
Commerce “has the inherent power to establish the parameters of the 
 
7 “Under the statutory scheme, Commerce owes deference to the intent of the proposed 
scope of an antidumping investigation as expressed in an antidumping petition. See 19 
U.S.C. § 1673; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b); see also NTN Bearing Corp. of Am. v. 
United States, 14 CIT 623, 626, 747 F.Supp. 726, 730 (1990) (‘If the petition is 
deemed sufficient, the ITA is statutorily obliged to insure that the proceedings are 
maintained in a form which corresponds to the petitioner’s clearly evinced intent and 
purpose.’) (citing Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. v. United States, 12 CIT 1025, 700 F. Supp. 
538 (1988), aff’d, 898 F.2d 1577, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1990))).” Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade 
Action Committee v. United States, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1174, n. 2 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2009) (citing Mitsubishi I and Mitsubishi II). 
8 “Commerce retains authority to define the scope of the investigation and may depart 
from the scope as proposed by a petition if it determines that petition to be ‘overly 
broad, or insufficiently specific to allow proper investigation, or in any other way 
defective.’ NTN Bearing Corp., 747 F. Supp. at 731 (citing Torrington Co. v. United 
States, 14 CIT 507, 745 F. Supp. 718 (1990), aff’d, 938 F.2d 1276, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 
1991)).” 
9 See Mitsubishi II, 898 F.2d at 1582. 
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investigation so that it would not be tied to an initial scope definition 
that . . . may not make sense in light of the information available to 
[Commerce]or subsequently obtained in the investigation.”10 This is 
because the “purpose of the petition is to propose an investigation,” 
while “[a] purpose of the investigation is to determine what 
merchandise should be included in the final order.”11 
Thus, the Federal Circuit has acknowledged that Commerce is 
granted a “large” amount of discretion to determine “the applicable 
scope” of an “order that will be effective to remedy the dumping that 
the Administration has found.”12 It is not uncommon that Commerce 
might need to adjust the scope of a petition to address concerns it has 
with respect to the ability of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), or 
Commerce itself, to administer or enforce a scope. Perhaps some of the 
proposed scope language might be too broad, or too narrow, or too 
confusing to administer at the border. For example, a petitioner in 
good faith might propose an exclusion for a “completed product” that 
in practice actually enters into the United States not in one shipment 
or entry, but in pieces over the span of several months. As CBP would 
only apply the exclusion to a “completed” product, the exclusion 
would therefore be worthless for all intents and purposes and likely 
cause confusion if importers nonetheless request exclusion upon 
importation of the individual parts. In another scenario, some 
language in a proposed scope might unintentionally cover a steel item 
already covered by other AD and CVD orders, forcing Commerce to 
modify the language to be assured that no single product enters the 
United States covered simultaneously (in full) by two different AD or 
two CVD orders.13 
 
10 See Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1087, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
11 See Duferco, 296 F.3d at 1096-1097 (citing to sections 19 U.S.C. §§1671a(b)(1), 
1671d(a)(1), 1673a(b)(1), and 1673d(a)(1)); see also Tak Fat Trading Company 
v. United States, 396 F.3d 1378, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Walgreen Co. v. 
United States, 620 F.3d 1350, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing to Duferco for the 
concept that “it is the responsibility of the agency, not those who initiated the 
proceedings, to determine the scope of the final orders”). 
12 See Mitsubishi II, 898 F.2d at 1583. 
13 Such a situation might not be a problem for a product composed of different parts 
which are separately covered by different Orders, like, for example, a product 
containing both extruded aluminum (one Order), and certain steel products (other 
Orders). In that scenario, importers might be able to individually report the different 
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Commerce might also have to remove certain products from 
the scope because the ITC has concluded a subset of products in the 
scope do not cause injury to the domestic industry. After all, an AD or 
CVD Order reflects “merchandise which is both in a class of 
merchandise being sold at (less than fair value)” or being unfairly 
subsidized “and which is causing material injury to the domestic 
industry.”14 Thus, under that scenario, the scope of the Order would 
naturally be smaller than the scope of the petition. 
Finally, Commerce might have to tweak the language of the 
scope to prevent the possibility of future evasion. As the CIT held in 
Mitsubishi I, and affirmed in Mitsubishi II, the Department “has been 
vested with authority to administer the antidumping laws in 
accordance with the legislative intent. To this end, [Commerce] has a 
certain amount of discretion to expand the language of a petition . . . 
with the purpose in mind of preventing the intentional evasion or 
circumvention of the antidumping duty laws.”15 Most recently, in 
Canadian Solar, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit affirmed that 
Commerce could consider evasion concerns when drafting the scope 
of an Order, holding that the “Tariff Act does not require Commerce 
to define the ‘class or kind of [foreign] merchandise’ in any particular 
manner. Because the Tariff Act is silent in this regard, Commerce has 
 
amounts of materials within the bigger product subject to the different Orders for 
purposes of assessing duties. Such an analysis would depend largely on Commerce’s 
instructions to CBP. 
14 Badger-Powhatan v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1364, 1370 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1986). 
15 See Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. v. United States, 700 F. Supp. 538, 555 (1988); see also 
id. at 556 (explaining that Commerce “has the authority to define and/or clarify what 
constitutes the subject merchandise to be investigated as set forth in the petition . . . 
taking into consideration such factors as . . . the known tactics of foreign industries 
attempting to avoid a countervailing duty order”), affirmed by Mitsubishi II, 898 F.2d 
at 1582 and 1584. Likewise, in Torrington I, the CIT upheld Commerce’s 
determination to “narrow the scope” by finding the existence of five classes or kinds 
of merchandise, although the petition had alleged the existence of a single, larger class 
or kind of merchandise. Torrington I, 745 F. Supp. at 721 n.4, aff’d Torrington II, 938 
F.2d at 1276. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s judgment, noting additionally 
that it would not “disturb” Commerce’s interpretation of the “involved sections of the 
antidumping duty laws” unless Commerce’s interpretation was “unreasonable.” 
Torrington II, 938 F.2d at 1278 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. at 837, 843-44 (1984)). 
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the authority to fill that gap and define the scope of an order consistent 
with the countervailing duty and antidumping duty laws.”16 
B. The Physical Description of the Class or Kind of 
Merchandise 
In defining the scope in every single investigation, Commerce 
must determine the physical description of the imported products 
alleged to have caused an injury to a domestic industry. As the CIT 
held in Sunpower, the “statute and the case law instruct that the term 
‘class or kind of merchandise’ refers to the products in a particular 
proceeding.”17 19 U.S.C. § 1677(25) defines “subject merchandise” as 
“the class or kind of merchandise that is within the scope of an 
investigation, a suspension agreement, an order under this subtitle or 
section 1303 of this title, or a finding under the Antidumping Act, 
1921.”18 (emphasis added). To be clear, the merchandise within the 
scope of an investigation meets the description of the merchandise 
initially set forth in the petition. Furthermore, the merchandise may be 
called “subject merchandise” throughout an investigation, but that 
description might change once the Order is issued, creating a new (and 
final) description of “subject merchandise.” 
Therefore, as Commerce explained in Sunpower, which the CIT 
affirmed, “class or kind of merchandise” does not refer to a “general 
type of product” that is somehow separate and removed from the 
language of the scope of an investigation or Order.19 It is instead a 
reference to the specific products described in the scope allegedly 
causing harm in a specific investigation. Analogizing a scope to a 
baked treat everyone enjoys, imagine the general term “blue widgets 
from Taiwan” represented by a round cookie. The scope might 
include, however, only dark blue widgets five inches or bigger and 
light blue widgets two inches or smaller, while excluding widgets 
 
16 Canadian Solar, Inc. v. United States, 918 F.3d 909, 917 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (Canadian 
Solar). 
17 Sunpower Corporation v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1286 (Ct. Int’l Trade. 
2017) (Sunpower), aff’d in Canadian Solar. 
18 19 U.S.C. § 1677(25). 
19 Sunpower, 253 F. Supp. 3d. at 1287 (quoting Commerce’s remand redetermination 
results in that litigation). 
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which are combination of light and dark blue. Suddenly, that “blue 
widgets” representative cookie is no longer round, but has multiple 
bite marks and cuts throughout, and the result might look more like 
an hourglass. This could be true even if in the past there was a revoked 
Order covering blue widgets from Taiwan that looked more like a fully 
round cookie, or a parallel Order on blue widgets from another 
country that takes on an entirely different shape. All these scopes 
might be generally described as covering “blue widgets,” but the class 
or kind of merchandise being investigated, and upon which an Order 
might be placed, can be narrower or broader than past or other current 
AD or CVD investigations covering blue widgets. Commerce is under 
no obligation in defining the physical description of the subject 
merchandise to exclude certain products, or to include additional 
products, just because prior or parallel Orders on “blue widgets” did, 
or did not, include that merchandise because, as the Federal Circuit 
has held, the class or kind of merchandise is “determined by the 
order.”20 
In general, an Order provides three explicit elements: (1) 
physical descriptions of the products covered by the Order; (2) 
physical descriptions of the products explicitly excluded from 
coverage by the Order; and (3) references to the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States subheadings that currently cover the 
described merchandise and are used for identification upon import. 
For an example, here is the AD Order covering Kegs from Mexico.21 
Scope of the Investigation 
The merchandise covered by this investigation are 
kegs, vessels, or containers with bodies that are 
approximately cylindrical in shape, made from 
stainless steel (i.e., steel containing at least 10.5 percent 
chromium by weight and less than 1.2 percent carbon 
by weight, with or without other elements), and that 
are compatible with a “D Sankey” extractor (refillable 
stainless steel kegs) with a nominal liquid volume 
 
20 See Target Corp. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Target 
II”); Smith Corona Corp. v. United States, 915 F.2d 683, 685 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
21 Refillable Stainless Steel Kegs From Mexico: Antidumping Duty Order, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 54,591 (Oct. 10, 2019). 
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capacity of 10 liters or more, regardless of the type of 
finish, gauge, thickness, or grade of stainless steel, and 
whether or not covered by or encased in other 
materials. Refillable stainless steel kegs may be 
imported assembled or unassembled, with or without 
all components (including spears, couplers or taps, 
necks, collars, and valves), and be filled or unfilled. 
“Unassembled” or “unfinished” refillable stainless 
steel kegs include drawn stainless steel cylinders that 
have been welded to form the body of the keg and 
attached to an upper (top) chime and/or lower 
(bottom) chime. Unassembled refillable stainless steel 
kegs may or may not be welded to a neck, may or may 
not have a valve assembly attached, and may be 
otherwise complete except for testing, certification, 
and/or marking. 
Subject merchandise also includes refillable stainless 
steel kegs that have been further processed in a third 
country, including but not limited to, attachment of 
necks, collars, spears or valves, heat treatment, 
pickling, passivation, painting, testing, certification or 
any other processing that would not otherwise remove 
the merchandise from the scope of the investigation if 
performed in the country of manufacture of the in-
scope refillable stainless steel keg. 
Specifically excluded are the following: 
(1) vessels or containers that are not approximately 
cylindrical in nature (e.g., box, “hopper” or “cone” 
shaped vessels); 
(2) stainless steel kegs, vessels, or containers that have 
either a “ball lock” valve system or a “pin lock” valve 
system (commonly known as “Cornelius,” “corny” or 
“ball lock” kegs); 
(3) necks, spears, couplers or taps, collars, and valves 
that are not imported with the subject merchandise; 
and 
(4) stainless steel kegs that are filled with beer, wine, or 
other liquid and that are designated by the 
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Commissioner of Customs as Instruments of 
International Traffic within the meaning of section 
332(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. 
The merchandise covered by these investigations are 
currently classified in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule 
of the United States (HTSUS) under subheadings 
7310.10.0010, 7310.10.0050, 7310.29.0025, and 
7310.29.0050. 
These HTSUS subheadings are provided for 
convenience and customs purposes; the written 
description of the scope of this investigation is 
dispositive. 
As one can see from the scope of the Kegs from Mexico Order, 
the scope starts with a general description of covered merchandise, 
then specifically excludes certain merchandise, and finally refers to the 
HTSUS subheadings that generally apply to the described 
merchandise. Notably, the last sentence of the scope of the Order 
includes language which appears in all AD and CVD Orders; an 
explicit provision that states that written descriptions of the subject 
merchandise are dispositive, not the HTSUS subheadings. The 
primary reason this sentence exists is because CBP is frequently called 
upon to issue Customs Rulings as to what terms and characteristics 
appearing in the HTSUS mean, and it is possible that when a descriptor 
in the HTSUS is the same or similar to the narrative of an AD or CVD 
Order, CBP might rule in a way on a term or terms that differs from 
Commerce’s interpretation or understanding of those same words.22 
This is not to say that Commerce does not sometimes agree with the 
CBP interpretation of a word or phrase. In fact, Commerce has even 
looked to CBP rulings for insight and guidance in making certain 
scope rulings in the past, such as in the scope ruling before the Federal 
Circuit in Tak Fat, in which the Court affirmed Commerce’s 
determination to look to CBP rulings for guidance on the meaning of 
the terms “marinated,” “acidified,” and “pickled.”23 Nonetheless, 
 
22 See generally Customs Ruling Online Search System, https://rulings.cbp.gov/home, 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2020) (CBP’s NY and HQ Customs rulings are found here). 
23 See Tak Fat Trading Company v. United States, 396 F.3d 1378, 1384-86 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). Note that when Commerce looked to those terms, it was doing so to interpret 
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HTSUS subheadings and CBP’s interpretation of those subheadings, 
although helpful in assisting the enforcement of AD and CVD Orders, 
do not trump the actual physical description of the merchandise 
provided in the scope. 
Perhaps the greatest challenge with defining the physical 
characteristics in a scope is that on one hand, the domestic industry 
wants the language to be general enough to cover models or types of 
merchandise similar to products causing them injury and that could 
easily take the place of current models being dumped or subsidized 
once an Order is in place (i.e., evasion or circumvention of the Order). 
But on the other hand, Commerce and the ITC require a great deal of 
specificity in the scope to address the injurious dumping and 
subsidization alleged in the first place. Furthermore, it is common for 
a domestic industry to produce certain models of a product, while 
importing other models.24 Obviously, in that scenario, the domestic 
industry wants the Order to only cover merchandise that is causing 
injury, not merchandise it is importing. Accordingly, to address these 
 
the text of the scope. Commerce did not stop its analysis in that case, though, at a 
simplistic “plain meaning” level of analysis, but analyzed the text as well using the 
sources listed in 19 CFR 351.225(k)(1), described below. 
24 In determining the physical characteristics of the products covered by a scope, one 
of the factors Commerce must consider is the domestic like product produced and sold 
by the petitioning domestic industry. Sections 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673a(c)(1)(ii) and 
(c)(4)(A) state that Commerce may only initiate an investigation if it determines 
within twenty days of filing that the “petition has been filed by or on behalf of the 
domestic industry, which must “account for at least 25 percent of the total production 
of the domestic like product” and support must “account for more than 50 percent of 
the production of the domestic like product produced by that portion of the industry.” 
Accordingly, Commerce must make its own “domestic like product” determination 
separate and apart from the “domestic like product” determination made by the ITC. 
See Fujitsu Limited v. United States, 36 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999). 
While Commerce and the ITC must both apply the statutory definition of domestic 
like product found at 19 U.S.C. §1677(10), “they do so for different purposes and 
pursuant to a separate and distinct authority. In addition, (Commerce’s) determination 
is subject to limitations of time and information. Although this may result in different 
definitions of the like product, such differences do not render the decision of either 
agency contrary to law.” Ni-Resist Piston Inserts from Argentina and the Republic of 
Korea: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations, 74 Fed. Reg. 8054, 8055-
8056 (Feb. 23, 2009) (referencing USEC, Inc. v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2001)). 
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concerns, exclusions play an extremely important role in finding that 
necessary balance between general and specific language. 
Frequently, but not always, the products listed as “excluded” 
in a scope would have been covered by the preceding scope language, 
but for the exclusion. By specifically listing models of merchandise not 
covered by the scope of the investigation or Order, the “class or kind” 
of merchandise subject to the investigation is expressly diminished – 
providing clarity to the products covered by the scope, and allowing 
the domestic industry and Commerce to focus on the imported 
merchandise allegedly causing harm. It is therefore no surprise that 
importers and exporters requesting scope rulings after the Order has 
been issued frequently argue that their merchandise should be 
determined to fall under one or more exclusions listed in the scope of 
the Order. Thus, just as it is important that the petitioners and 
Commerce draft a general scope description that is accurate and clear, 
so too is it extremely vital that all exclusions in the scope are as clearly 
articulated as possible. Otherwise, CBP’s ability to administer the 
scope upon importation of merchandise, and Commerce’s ability to 
make a scope ruling upon request following the issuance of the Order, 
become more of a challenge and quite possibly controversial. 
Another challenge which petitioners and Commerce 
frequently face in defining the scope of an Order is “usage” language. 
There are many products that are distinguished and described in the 
trade in accordance with their usage and reflect the clear intent of the 
products that the petitioners want to have covered. Nonetheless, 
Commerce does its best to avoid such language in its scopes. The 
reasons for that avoidance are best described through examples, such 
as the current AD Order on Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China.25 The 
scope of that Order is extremely detailed and specific, but the 
fundamental usage term “bedroom” in the scope narrative proved to 
be a challenge for Commerce when wooden furniture meeting all the 
physical characteristics of chests of drawers in the scope were 
sometimes advertised for use in other rooms in the household and 
 
25 See Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and 
Antidumping Duty Order: Wooden Bedroom Furniture From the People’s Republic 
of China, 70 Fed. Reg. 329 (January 4, 2005). 
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sometimes shown as being used in a bedroom.26 At that point, the 
question faced by Commerce and the Court on appeal was: What 
makes furniture used in the bedroom “bedroom furniture” for 
purposes of the AD Order? Is it the capacity to store clothing, 
particular design features, or something else?27 As explained below, 
the answer to that question was subject to different interpretations by 
Commerce and the Court based on the evidence on the record. 
Unquestionably, however, the most infamous example of 
exclusion language pertains to an exclusion to Petroleum Wax Candles 
from China28 issued in the late 1980s for “certain novelty candles 
specially designed for use only in connection with the Christmas 
holiday season” and candles associated with “scenes or symbols” for 
“religious holidays or special events.”29 That scope exclusion forced 
Commerce to struggle numerous times over whether, for example, 
heart and flower shaped candles were included by the Order, as they 
could be used and shared on Valentine’s Day but could also be shared 
and used all year round.30 Indeed, there are many stories arising out 
of the enforcement of that particular scope in which Commerce teams 
had to decide, for example, if a lumpy red candle was more akin to 
Sesame Street’s Elmo, a garden gnome, or Santa Claus. For this reason, 
Commerce strongly dissuades domestic industries from including 
usage language in scopes and takes a critical look at such language if 
it is proposed for inclusion in the scope of a petition during 
investigation. 
C. The Country of Origin of the Class or Kind of 
Merchandise 
In addition to the physical description of the products covered 
and excluded from the AD or CVD Order, a scope also identifies “the 
 
26 Ethan Allen Operations, Inc. v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1348-53 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 2015). 
27 Id. 
28 Antidumping Duty Order: Petroleum Wax Candles from the People’s Republic of 
China, 51 Fed. Reg. 30686 (August 28, 1986). 
29 Russ Berrie & Company, Inc. v. United States, 23 C.I.T 429, 430 (July 13, 1999). 
30 See id. at 441 (affirming Commerce’s determination that they were not excluded in 
that case). 
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merchandise’s country of origin.”31 In most investigations, that is not 
a significant issue. A blue widget from China made entirely in China 
is Chinese in origin, and no one would argue otherwise. However, 
sometimes, a product might, in fact, be manufactured in more than one 
country – part of the product might be made in one country and then 
completed in a second, third, or even fourth country. In that situation, 
Commerce might have to conduct a country of origin analysis. 
Frequently, the issue arises in an investigation, but sometimes it does 
not become a matter for dispute until a scope ruling request has been 
made, long after the Order has been issued. 
The Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and codified in Section 19 
of the United States Code, is silent on a country of origin analysis, but 
the Federal Circuit has held that “Commerce’s authority to define the 
class or kind of merchandise within the scope of an order encompasses 
the authority to determine the country of origin.”32 Commerce’s 
traditional country of origin test is known as the “substantial 
transformation” test or analysis.33 In particular, Commerce generally 
uses this analysis to determine whether a product’s country of origin 
has changed as a result of processing that occurs in third countries 
before a product is imported into the United States. Courts have 
upheld Commerce’s substantial transformation analysis,34 which has, 
in different iterations and based on different fact patterns, looked at 
factors such as: (1) whether the processed downstream product is a 
different class or kind of merchandise than the upstream product; (2) 
the technical, physical, and chemical characteristics of the product and 
its parts; (3) the intended end-use of the product; (4) the cost of 
production and value added to the product as a result of further 
processing in third countries; (5) the nature and sophistication of 
 
31 Canadian Solar, Inc. v. United States, 918 F.3d 909, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
32 Id. at 917. 
33 See Bell Supply Company, LLC v. United States, 888 F.3d 1222, 1228-29 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (“A substantial transformation occurs where, ‘as a result of manufacturing or 
processing steps . . .[,] the [product] loses its identity and is transformed into a new 
product having a new name, character and use.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
34 See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 2d 854, 858 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 1998) (“The ‘substantial transformation’ rule provides a yardstick for 
determining whether the processes performed on merchandise in a country are of such 
significance as to require the resulting merchandise to be considered the product of 
the country in which the transformation occurred”). 
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processing in third countries; (6) the level of investment in third 
countries; (7) where the essential component of the product (if there is 
one) is produced; and/or (8) where the essential characteristics of the 
product are imported. 
All that being said, Commerce is not required by law to apply 
its “substantial transformation” test to determine the country of origin 
for purposes of the scope of an Order, and in 2019 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed Commerce’s determination to use an alternative “country of 
assembly” (of solar panels) test in Canadian Solar.35 Chinese solar panel 
companies had earlier shifted the production of their solar cells to 
other countries, such as Taiwan, to avoid the payment of duties when 
Commerce had determined that the country of origin for previous AD 
and CVD Orders was determined by the fabrication of the solar cell 
under the agency’s substantial transformation analysis.36 In new 
petitions, the domestic industry had explained that this shift in 
production had largely undermined the effectiveness of the previous 
Orders. After contentious new investigations, Commerce concluded 
that the application of a different country of origin test was necessary 
in the resulting new AD and CVD Orders to address injurious 
dumping and subsidization of solar panels exported to the United 
States.37 The Federal Circuit agreed, holding that “evasion concerns 
constitute a reasoned explanation for departing from Commerce’s 
previous practice.”38 
Thus, in determining the scope of an Order, Commerce must 
consider not just the physical descriptions of the merchandise at issue, 
but in some cases also the country of origin of the merchandise,39 
taking into consideration the best methodology available to address 
 
35 Canadian Solar, 918 F.3d at 917. 
36 See id. at 919. 
37 Id. at 915-20. See Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products From the 
People’s Republic of China: Antidumping Duty Order; and Amended Final 
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Countervailing Duty Order, 80 
Fed. Reg. 8,592 (Feb. 18, 2015). 
38 Canadian Solar, 918 F.3d at 919. 
39 It is worth pointing out that Commerce is not bound by the country of origin 
determinations of other agencies, such as CBP. Sometimes confusion arises out of the 
fact that CBP might conclude a product has a different country of origin from that 
determined by Commerce. Each agency’s country of origin analysis is based on 
different factors for different reasons. 
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the alleged injurious dumping and subsidization of certain imported 
products. 
III. INTERPRETING THE SCOPE OF AN AD OR CVD ORDER 
THROUGH A SCOPE RULING 
Once the AD or CVD Order has been issued, the scope is like 
hardened concrete. It is changeable only through a changed 
circumstances review,40 and then only by shrinking the amount of 
products covered by the scope as originally set forth in the Order, and 
then usually only with the consent of the injured domestic parties. 
Nonetheless, Commerce frequently is called upon to issue a “scope 
ruling” to determine if something is or is not covered by the scope of 
the Order at issue. Section 19 U.S.C. §1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi) provides that 
the CIT has jurisdiction to review “(a) determination by the 
administering authority as to whether a particular type of merchandise 
is within the class or kind of merchandise described in an existing 
finding of dumping or antidumping or countervailing duty order.”41 
Like other Commerce determinations, the CIT and Federal Circuit are 
directed by the statute to uphold Commerce’s determinations, 
findings, or conclusions unless they are “unsupported by substantial 
evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”42 
Substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”43 
Other than those provisions, no other section of the statute 
directly applies to Commerce’s scope rulings. The “class or kind” 
provisions described in the first section above directly applies only to 
the process of defining the scope in the underlying investigation. The 
circumvention provision, as discussed below, by necessity requires 
that Commerce initially determine if a product is, or is not, covered by 
the scope of an Order, but that analysis is conducted only in the context 
 
40 See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)(1). 
41 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi). 
42 Judicial review in countervailing duty and antidumping duty proceedings, 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). 
43 A.L. Patterson, Inc. v. United States, 585 Fed. Appx. 778, 781–82 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 
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of making a circumvention determination.44 Accordingly, Commerce’s 
scope ruling proceedings are governed almost entirely by its scope 
ruling regulations found in 19 C.F.R. 351.225. 
A. The Scope Ruling Regulations 
Section 225(a) of the scope regulations provides the processes 
by which an interested party may make a request for a scope inquiry, 
section (b) allows for Commerce to self-initiate, and section (c) 
describes the contents of an application for a scope ruling and 
deadlines. For purposes of this paper, however, it is section (d) that is 
particularly relevant because it states that if Commerce can 
“determine, based solely upon the application and the descriptions of 
the merchandise referred to in paragraph (k)(1) of this section whether 
a product is included within the scope of an order” Commerce “will 
issue a final ruling as to whether the product is included within the 
order . . . .” Section (k) is arguably the most significant provision within 
Section 225, and (k)(1) in particular lists four sources of information 
Commerce should consider in making a determination under section 
(d): “The descriptions of the merchandise contained in the petition, the 
initial investigation, and the determinations of the Secretary (including 
prior scope determinations) and the Commission.” 
By its terms, one might infer from the text of section 225(d) that 
any information on the record which cannot be found in the scope 
application or in one of the (k)(1) sources of information therefore 
cannot be considered for purposes of a determination under that 
provision, but such a reading directly conflicts with the requirements 
of 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) that Commerce’s determinations be 
based on the “substantial evidence” on the record. This issue arose in 
the long and drawn out litigation covering “curtain walls,” which were 
imported in multiple parts and in multiple entries over a lengthy 
period of time to the United States under AD and CVD Orders 
covering Aluminum Extrusions from China.45 The court held that 
because the record included a “letter, written by Petitioners 
 
44 See Prevention of Circumvention of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 
19 U.S.C. § 1677j. 
45 Shenyang Yuanda Alum. Indus. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1331, 
1351 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016) (“Yuanda I”). 
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specifically for this scope proceeding, supporting Commerce’s 
position, and a news article quoting Petitioner’s counsel . . .” that were 
“not (k)(1) materials,” “neither of these documents” were 
“appropriate” for Commerce to consider as part of its analysis.46 
Commerce explained on remand that the referenced “news article” 
was actually attached to the scope request application, and therefore 
was appropriate for consideration under section 225(d), and that the 
Petitioner’s letter was not one of those factors. Nonetheless, the letter 
was a relevant part of the administrative record, and therefore, under 
19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i), Commerce could not just ignore that 
record evidence in making its determination.47 In time, the CIT upheld 
Commerce’s underlying scope ruling, as further analyzed on 
remand,48 and on appeal, in 2019, the Federal Circuit held that 
Commerce’s scope ruling was supported by substantial evidence on 
the record and otherwise in accordance with law.49 Thus, although 
section 225(d) does allow for Commerce to make a determination 
based on a smaller administrative record than it would otherwise have 
before it, were it to invite comment and briefing from the parties, it 
does not permit the agency to outright ignore information that is 
already on the record at the time it makes its scope ruling 
determination. 
The remainder of section 225 provides notice and comment 
requirements for scope rulings, allows for consolidation of scope 
inquiries, and directs Commerce to order suspension of liquidation of 
imports upon entry under various scenarios. But, for purposes of this 
paper, section 225(k)(2) is key.50 Section 225(k)(2) provides that if the 
 
46 Id. 
47 Shenyang Yuanda v. United States, Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to 
Court Remand, filed pursuant to Consol. Court No. 14-00106, dated May 12, 2016, at 
22 (found at enforcement.trade.gov/remands/16-11.pdf). In a subsequent remand, 
filed in the same litigation, pursuant to Court Order on October 6, 2016, Commerce 
filed a subsequent Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand on 
January 19, 2017, where it addressed this matter for the Court at pages 52 and 53 of 
the remand redetermination. 
48 Shenyang Yuanda Alum. Indus. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 3d 1209 
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2017) (“Yuanda II”). 
49 Shenyang Yuanda Alum. Indus. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 918 F.3d 1355, 1366-
68 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Yuanda III”). 
50 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 225(e), (f), (l), (m), (n) and (o). 
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(k)(1) factors and the application are “not dispositive,” Commerce 
“will further consider” the following: “(i) The physical characteristics 
of the product; (ii) The expectations of the ultimate purchasers; (iii) The 
ultimate use of the product; (iv) The channels of trade in which the 
product is sold; and (v) The manner in which the product is advertised 
and displayed.” These factors are commonly referred to as the 
Diversified Products factors, named after a 1983 CIT case in which the 
Court affirmed Commerce’s use of the first four of those listed 
criteria.51 As the regulation provides, Commerce considers these 
factors only as a last step in analyzing whether or not merchandise is 
subject to an Order. 
B. The Federal Circuit’s Plain Meaning Rule 
In Duferco, the Federal Circuit explained that it “grants 
significant deference to Commerce’s own interpretation of (its) 
orders,”52 but stressed that unlike in the procedures defining a scope 
in an investigation, “Commerce cannot ‘interpret’ an antidumping 
order so as to change the scope of that order, nor can Commerce 
interpret an order in a manner contrary to its terms.”53 Indeed, the 
Federal Circuit has stated in multiple holdings that in making a scope 
ruling, Commerce must first consider the “plain language of the 
Orders,” calling the language of the scopes “the cornerstone” of “any 
scope determination.54 This line of reasoning has unfortunately 
resulted in at least three different interpretations of (and/or by) the 
Federal Circuit’s holding that Commerce must first consider the plain 
meaning of scope before looking to the (k)(1) sources of information, 
and what the courts must consider when Commerce has done a (k)(1) 
and/or (k)(2) analysis. 
 
51 See Diversified Products Corp. v. United States, 572 F. Supp. 883, 889 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 1983). 
52 See Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1087, 1094-95 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(citing Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’n, Inc. v. United States, 60 F.3d 778, 782 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995). 
53 Id. at 1095 (quoting Eckstrom Indus., Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1068, 1072 
(Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
54 See Walgreen Co. v. United States, 620 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also, 
e.g., Shenyang Yuanda Alum. Indus. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 776 F.3d 1351, 1356 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Yuanda 2015”). 
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Under all three interpretations, there is no disagreement that 
Commerce must first consider the plain, unambiguous meaning of the 
scope of the Orders. Nonetheless, under the Federal Circuit’s holding 
in Fedmet, because the plain language is “paramount,” in “reviewing 
the plain language of a duty order,” “Commerce must consider the 
descriptions of the merchandise contained in the petition, the initial 
investigation, and the determinations of the Secretary (including prior 
determinations) and the Commission.”55 In other words, under the 
Federal Circuit’s holding in Fedmet, Commerce cannot ignore the (k)(1) 
sources of information, but must always consider those sources in 
analyzing the plain language of the scope of an Order to determine if 
the language is unambiguous. 
Under the second class of cases, Commerce can make a 
determination based on the plain meaning of the scope, (sometimes 
referred to informally as a “k(0)” analysis by parties to Commerce’s 
proceedings), but if Commerce determines to also consider (k)(1) 
sources of information, then the CIT and Federal Circuit must consider 
those sources as well in its holding. For example, in Wheatland Tube Co. 
v. United States, the Federal Circuit held that “because the description 
of the merchandise contained in the” Orders as well as “the initial 
investigation” was “unambiguous,” “Commerce was not required to 
examine the physical characteristics of the accused product, the 
expectations of the ultimate purchasers, the ultimate use of the accused 
product, or the channels of trade” (i.e., the (k)(2) factors).56 In that case, 
Commerce’s interpretation of the scope was considered in tandem 
with additional regulatory factors, such as the initial investigation 
record, and not instead of those factors. Likewise, in its 2015 Shandong 
Yuanda holding, after affirming Commerce’s determination that 
Yuanda’s merchandise was “within the plan language of the Orders,” 
the Federal Circuit then turned to the (k)(1) factors and explained that 
“[i]n addition to the plain language of the Orders,” Commerce “will 
also consider the descriptions of the merchandise contained in the 
petition, the initial investigation, and the prior determinations of 
Commerce and the ITC.”57 Subsequently, they affirmed Commerce’s 
(k)(1) analysis as well. Although the language quoted suggests the 
 
55 Fedmet Res. Corp. v. United States, 755 F.3d 912, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
56 Wheatland Tube Company v. United States, 161 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
57 Yuanda 2015, 776 F.3d at 1357-58 (emphasis added). 
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Court was saying that it “will consider” both steps of analysis, the 
sequence of the Court’s analysis and holdings suggested that these 
steps were considered separately because Commerce had considered 
both the plain language and the (k)(1) sources of information. 
Even more recently, as part of this second class of cases, in 
Meridian Products, LLC v. United States, the Federal Circuit stressed that 
if the “scope is unambiguous, it governs,” but that “the question of 
whether the unambiguous terms of a scope control the inquiry, or 
whether some ambiguity exists, is a question of law that” the Court 
reviews “de novo.”58 The Federal Circuit explained that “Scope orders 
are interpreted with the aid of” other sources “as described by” section 
(k)(1) of the agency’s regulation, and the Court then, as part of its 
analysis, reviewed the factors relied upon by Commerce, such as prior 
scope determinations, to conclude that the language of the scope was 
“unambiguous.”59 
In all of these decisions from the second class of cases, the 
Federal Circuit seemed to indicate that if Commerce considered just 
the plain meaning, the Court would also stop its analysis there. On the 
other hand, if Commerce considered both the plain meaning of the 
scope as well as the (k)(1) sources of information in making its scope 
determination, then the Court signified that it would also consider 
both the language as well as the (k)(1) sources of information, 
consistent with the substantial evidence on the record standard, set 
forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). 
These decisions contrast with a third strain of cases, such as the 
Federal Circuit’s 2012 decision in Arcelormittal.60 The litigation 
pertained to the AD Order on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils (SSPC) from 
Belgium.61 Key to the dispute was the scope language covering 
products which were “4.75 mm or more in thickness.”62 Years earlier, 
in an investigation of certain cut-to-length carbon steel plates from 
South Africa, Commerce determined that the same language referred 
 
58 Meridian Prod., LLC v. United States, 851 F.3d 1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
59 Id. at 1382. 
60 Arcelormittal Stainless Belgium v. United States, 694 F.3d 82 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
61 Notice of Amended Antidumping Duty Orders; Certain Stainless Steel Plate in Coils 
from Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, and Taiwan, 68 
Fed. Reg. 11,520 (Mar. 11, 2003). 
62 Arcelormittal, 694 F. 3d at 86-7. 
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to actual thickness and not nominal thickness.63 Nonetheless, in the 
scope ruling at issue in this case, Commerce determined the language 
referred to “SSPC having a nominal thickness of 4.75 mm but an actual 
thickness of less than 4.75 mm.”64 In the end, the Federal Circuit 
overturned Commerce’s scope ruling that the merchandise at issue 
was covered by the scope of the AD Order, which was based on a 
conclusion that the scope language was ambiguous, the (k)(1) sources 
of information were not determinative, and that the (k)(2) factors 
supported finding the product to be subject merchandise. The Federal 
Circuit held that Commerce had unlawfully enlarged the scope 
through its new interpretation, because: “[o]ver the course of five 
years, Commerce repeatedly reassured” the exporter “that nominal 
merchandise as such was excluded from the scope of the order.”65 
Significantly, the Federal Circuit pointedly emphasized “the first step 
in a scope ruling proceeding is to determine whether the governing 
language is in fact ambiguous, and thus requires analysis of the 
regulatory factors previously outlined. If it is not ambiguous, the plain 
meaning of the language governs.”66 The Court then went on to look 
at three factors in determining if the plain language was unambiguous: 
(1) the text of the scope; (2) “trade usage” (stating that “a finding of no 
ambiguity for unmodified numbers may be rebutted by sufficient 
evidence showing that actual measurements are not customarily used 
in the relevant industry”); and (3) Commerce’s previous interpretation 
of the same language in the 1997 South African carbon steel plate AD 
Order.67 The Court did not consider Commerce’s (k)(1) or (k)(2) 
analysis, but determined on the basis of these three factors alone that 
the scope was unambiguous, and therefore Commerce’s scope ruling 
was “contrary to the plain language of the order.”68 
More recently, in OMG, Inc. v. United States, the CIT, similar to 
the Federal Circuit’s approach in Arcelormittal, abstained from 
consideration of Commerce’s (k)(1) analysis and instead determined 
 
63 Notice of Final Determination of Sales of Less than Fair Value: Certain Cut-to-
Length Carbon Steel Plate from South Africa, 62 Fed. Reg. 61,731 (Nov. 19, 1997). 
64 Arcelormittal, 694 F. 3d at 83-4. 
65 Id. at 90. 
66 Id. at 87. 
67 Id. at 88. 
68 Id. at 84. 
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that the plain meaning did not support Commerce’s determination 
and ended its analysis there.69 In the facts of that particular litigation, 
Commerce had issued a scope ruling in which it determined that both 
the plain meaning of the AD and CVD Orders covering Certain Steel 
Nails from Vietnam,70 as well as the (k)(1) sources of information, 
supported its determination that certain zinc anchors were steel 
nails.71 The Court, citing to traditional statutory tools of interpretation, 
looked to the definition of a “nail” as defined by the American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, which had not been 
analyzed by Commerce in the scope ruling, as well as certain examples 
of trade usage which were on the record that showed some “industry 
actors categorize anchors with steel pins as anchors rather than as 
nails,”72 and overturned Commerce’s scope ruling as inconsistent with 
the “plain meaning of the word ‘nail.’”73 The Court did not reach 
Commerce’s analysis of the(k)(1) sources of information because the 
Court found that the Federal Circuit has concluded that “if the terms 
of” an order “are unambiguous, then those terms govern.”74 
Commerce raised its record evidence concerns with the Court on 
remand, but the Court called those concerns “not meritorious,” 
explaining that its interpretation of the plain meaning of the scope 
language was based in part on an analysis of the phrase “two or more 
pieces” and was supported by trade usage on the record.75 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s reliance on the 
dictionary to determine the “plain meaning” in OMG CAFC. Looking 
to Commerce’s current regulations, the Federal Circuit pointed out 
that section 351.225(a)(1) of those regulations indicates that scope 
 
69 OMG, Inc. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1262, 1268 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2018) 
[hereinafter OMG], aff’d, 972 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2020) [hereinafter OMG CAFC]. 
70 See Certain Steel Nails from the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Sultanate of 
Oman, Taiwan, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Antidumping Duty Orders, 80 
Fed. Reg. 39,994 (July 13, 2015). 
71 OMG, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 1268. 
72 Id. 
73 OMG, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 1268. 
74 Id. at 1264. Surprisingly, for support of its contention, the Court cited to Tak Fat, a 
case in which Commerce had, in fact, analyzed (k)(1) factors and the Federal Circuit 
considered those factors as part of its holding. Tak Fat, 396 F.3d at 1382. 
75 OMG, 389 F. Supp. 3d at 1314. 
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rulings are intended to “clarify” the scope of an order.76 The Federal 
Circuit held that therefore under that idea of “clarification” of the text, 
the Court was required to “consider ambiguity of the Orders’ scope 
language in the context of anchors.”77 The Court held that a 
determination of whether or not the scope was ambiguous was a 
“question of fact reviewed for substantial evidence,” and that it 
determined that under the description of the products in this scope, 
the facts supporting the finding of the products to be non-subject 
merchandise were unambiguous.78 With respect to the “plain 
meaning” and “dictionary” arguments, the Federal Circuit held that 
under the current regulations, “the first step is to determine whether 
the governing language is in fact ambiguous,” and if it is not 
ambiguous, the “plain meaning of the language governs.”79 The 
Federal Circuit held in that case that only if the language is ambiguous, 
does it “next consider the regulatory history, as contained in the so-
called (k)(1) materials.”80 The Court held that under its interpretation 
of the “plain meaning rule” test, “as a threshold matter, the CIT may 
consult dictionary definitions to assist in determining the plain 
meaning in an antidumping or countervailing duty order,” and that 
although “some of the dictionary definitions the CIT considered (in 
this case were), indeed narrower than the Orders’ scope language, the 
CIT did not rest its conclusion on those differences” in this case.81 
As reflected in these three different interpretations of the 
application of the Federal Circuit’s plain meaning rule holdings, the 
problem with any “plain meaning” test is that language is imperfect, 
and one person’s idea of the “plain meaning,” might be another 
person’s idea of ambiguity. As one author explained, “the plain 
meaning rule . . . ties the interpretation of” text to “subjective notions 
of what words mean in language and prevents parties from submitting 
evidence of alternate meanings that may be publicly used and 
acknowledged, but not set forth in a standard dictionary. Furthermore, 
the plain meaning rule (or at least unsophisticated versions of it) relies 
 
76 OMG CAFC, 972 F.3d at *8. 
77 Id. at *9. 
78 Id. at *9-10. 
79 Id. at *9. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at *15-17 
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upon the notion that words and phrases can, standing alone, have a 
single unequivocal meaning--a notion that has been thoroughly 
debunked by modern scholars who study language.”82 In addition, the 
presumption of a “plain” meaning to words in dispute can create 
serious problems, as starkly reflected in OMG CAFC, wherein the 
exporters were convinced that their interpretation was clear and 
unambiguous, while Commerce was convinced that its interpretation 
was clear and unambiguous. As explained above, the Federal Circuit 
held that it agreed with both parties that the plain language was 
unambiguous,83 and then sided with the exporters’ interpretation. 
However, objectively, logic would seem to suggest that if there are two 
interpretations of a scope which are both substantiated by facts and 
legally credible arguments, then perhaps in truth the “plain meaning” 
of the scope is not so “plain” at all. 
In any case, arguably, any interpretation of the Federal 
Circuit’s plain meaning rule that would permit a scope analysis that 
does not take into consideration the entirety of record evidence at the 
time the scope ruling is issued by Commerce is inconsistent with the 
substantial evidence on the record standard set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 
1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). However, the language used by the Federal Circuit 
and the CIT in multiple cases does seem to suggest that the plain 
meaning rule analysis could possibly be considered a zero sum game 
– one allowing Commerce to forgo an analysis under section 225(k) 
entirely, even if the substantial evidence on the record supports the 
existence of ambiguity in the text of the scope. It is also unclear how 
such an interpretation is consistent with the text of the regulation itself, 
as section 225(k) does not describe a plain meaning rule that ignores 
entirely the application of the (k)(1) sources of information. However, 
such an interpretation is certainly logical and practical in those 
situations when, for example, it is unequivocally clear to Commerce 
that a scope is unambiguous and no party disagrees on the record with 
a particular interpretation. In any case, as these various CIT and 
Federal Circuit holdings show, this legal interpretation of the current 
regulations and the Federal Circuit’s plain meaning rule appears to 
 
82 Aaron D. Goldstein, The Public Meaning Rule: Reconciling Meaning, Intent and 
Contract Interpretation, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73, 75 (2013). 
83 OMG CAFC, 972 F.3d at *10. 
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remain, as of 2020, an outstanding source of disagreement, confusion, 
or at minimum, inconsistency, in the courts. 
On August 13, 2020, Commerce proposed extensive 
modifications and revisions to its scope and circumvention 
regulations.84 This paper does not discuss most of those modifications 
because they are not yet final as of the writing of this document and 
could undergo further changes before being finalized. Many of the 
Proposed Modifications codify Commerce’s existing practice in different 
areas, such as the mixed media analysis described below.85 However, 
there are some important proposed differences, including changes to 
19 CFR 351.225(a) and (k) to address the obvious “plain meaning rule” 
problem. As Commerce explained in the Preamble to the Proposed 
Modifications, “courts have tried to use” “the term ‘clarify’ in current 
paragraph (a),” “to draw a distinction between scope language which 
is ‘unambiguous’ and therefore does not require ‘clarification’ under 
the section 351.225 procedures, and scope language which is 
‘ambiguous’ and does require such ‘clarification.’”86 Commerce 
explained that scope rulings are “intended to cover a wide variety of 
scope questions and are not intended to be restrictive to only those 
scenarios in which certain language in the scope requires 
‘clarification.’”87 Accordingly, Commerce’s proposal removes the term 
“clarify” from 19 CFR 351.225(a). 
In addition, Commerce has proposed revising section (k) to 
“codify” the Federal Circuit’s “judicially created affirmed framework, 
explaining that the primary analysis in any scope inquiry is the 
language of the scope itself.”88 However, rather than draw a bright line 
between the text of the scope and the (k)(1) sources, as the Federal 
Circuit has done in certain, but not all, cases, Commerce explained that 
the revised paragraph (k) would indicate that “in considering the plain 
language of the scope, Commerce, at its discretion, could also consider 
the underlying petition, Commerce’s investigation, prior Commerce 
 
84 See Regulations to Improve Administration and Enforcement of Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Laws: Proposed Rule; Request for Comments, 85 Fed. Reg. 
49,472 (August 13, 2020) (Proposed Modifications). 
85 See id. at 49,497. 
86 See id. at 49,476 -77. 
87 Id. at 49,477. 
88 Id. at 49,480. 
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determinations (including, but not limited to prior scope rulings, 
memoranda, or clarifications), and determinations of the ITC.”89 In 
other words, rather than treating a plain meaning analysis as separate 
from the substantial evidence on the record as to the meaning of those 
terms, the proposed regulations would codify that the sources 
appearing in (k)(1) are interpretive tools themselves used to determine 
if the language is ambiguous or unambiguous in the first place. In 
addition, Commerce explained in the Preamble to the Proposed 
Modifications that “Commerce could also consider traditional 
interpretive tools, such as a dictionary and industry usage of a 
particular word or phrase, or other record evidence, to provide context 
and understanding in considering the plain language of the scope. 
However, in the event of a conflict between these interpretive tools or 
other record evidence and the sources identified in paragraph (k)(1), 
Commerce would adopt the interpretation supported by the (k)(1) 
sources.”90 As noted, these regulatory changes are merely proposed as 
of the writing of this paper, and it is possible that they may undergo 
further revision before they are finalized, likely in 2021. 
C. Judicial Deference Over (k)(1) and (k)(2) 
Determinations 
With respect to Commerce’s (k)(1) and (k)(2) analyses, the 
degree of deference that the CIT and the Federal Circuit give the 
agency clearly depends on the facts of the case, the thoroughness of 
Commerce’s analysis, and the factors the court believes to be of the 
greatest significance. Courts frequently affirm Commerce’s scope 
analysis, but there have been several cases in which a court overturned 
the agency based on a different view of the relevance and prioritization 
of the facts on the administrative record. For example, in the 
aforementioned Ethan Allen litigation, Commerce received a scope 
request for four types of chests of drawers allegedly manufactured and 
marketed for use in a living room and hallway, rather than a 
bedroom.91 One chest in particular was sold as part of a furniture set, 
 
89 Id. at 49,480-81. 
90 Id. at 49,481. 
91 Ethan Allen Operations, Inc. v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1345 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2015). 
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was comparable in size and storage capacity to standard bedroom 
chests, and Commerce placed on the record a picture from Ethan 
Allen’s website that showed furniture from that set being used in a 
bedroom and five pictures from Ethan Allen’s Facebook page showing 
the chest itself being used in a bedroom setting.92 Commerce 
determined that the (k)(1) sources of information were not dispositive 
with respect to that chest, and applied a (k)(2) analysis, finding the 
chest to be covered by the scope of the Wooden Bedroom Furniture from 
China Order under the Diversified Products factors.93 On the other hand, 
with respect to the other three chests that were sold as “stand alone” 
chests, Commerce determined that each chest was subject to the order 
based on a (k)(1) analysis.94 
In its scope ruling on all four chests, Ethan Allen argued that 
Commerce should make a determination based almost entirely on the 
“design” elements of the chests, such as the cut and style of the chest 
sides and feet. Commerce did not make that its primary focus, 
explaining that furniture design is a subjective element not included in 
the (k)(1) sources of information and only one element among many in 
an analysis based on the (k)(2) factors. 
On appeal, the CIT, on the other hand, had no such problem 
giving priority to the design elements of the chests. The Court was 
persuaded by Ethan Allen’s claims that the furniture set was 
“designed for use in the living room” after reviewing the record 
evidence, and therefore held that Commerce should have applied only 
a (k)(1) analysis to the first chest,95 while each of the “stand alone” 
chests had “qualities of both a wooden bedroom chest (ability to store 
clothing) and a wooden living room chest (decorative),” and therefore 
Commerce should have applied a (k)(2) analysis to those chests.96 On 
remand, Commerce determined that each chest should be excluded 
from the scope of the Order, based almost entirely on the Court’s 
holdings that they were each “designed” for use outside of the 
 
92 Id. at 1345-48. 
93 See id. 
94 See id. at 1348-49. 
95 Id. at 1351-52. 
96 Ethan Allen, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 1348-51. 
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bedroom or contained non-bedroom decorative features, and the 
Court affirmed that conclusion.97 
 In Ethan Allen, Commerce and the Court each had the 
same facts before them. However, they disagreed that the record 
objectively supported Ethan Allen’s claims that despite the company’s 
website and Facebook posts showing the chests and furniture sets at 
issue being used in bedrooms, and the fact that all the chests at issue 
could store clothing (a requirement found in the scope itself), certain 
design elements were key to distinguishing those chests from 
“wooden bedroom furniture” subject to the scope of the Order at issue. 
This is a good example to show that in many scope ruling cases on 
appeal, it is not the existence of facts themselves on the record that are 
in dispute, but the priority and relevance assigned to each of those 
facts by Commerce that leads the CIT and Federal Circuit to affirm or 
overturn Commerce’s determinations under sections 225(k)(1) and 
(k)(2). 
D. Commerce’s Mixed Media Analysis 
Most scope rulings involve a review of individual products 
under section 225(k), but sometimes Commerce is called upon to 
review products which are components in a larger collection of 
merchandise. For example, in Walgreen, the Federal Circuit addressed 
a scope ruling pertaining to the AD Order on Tissue Paper from China98 
in which the tissue paper was contained in Walgreen’s “Gift Bag to 
Go” gift bag sets that also contained a gift bag and crinkle bow.99 In 
accordance with its practice, Commerce applied its “mixed media” 
analysis, first determining whether the gift bag was a stand-alone 
“unique” product, or “merely subject merchandise packaged with 
non-subject merchandise.”100 Then, once it determined that the gift 
bags met the latter description, Commerce determined that the tissue 
 
97 Ethan Allen Operations, Inc. v. United States, No. 14-00147 (Ct. Int’l Trade Feb. 
29, 2016). 
98 Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value and 
Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Tissue Paper Products from the People’s Republic 
of China, 70 Fed. Reg. 16223 (March 30, 2005). 
99 Walgreen Co. of Deerfield, IL v. United States, 620 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
100 Id. 
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paper components of the gift bags were subject to the AD Order, in 
accordance with 19 CFR 351.225(k)(1).101 The Federal Circuit affirmed 
Commerce’s analysis, holding that because “the gift bag sets did not 
interact in any way or otherwise represent a unique product,” and “the 
tissue paper contained therein retained its individual character,” 
Commerce “properly determined, based on the (k)(1) criteria and the 
language of the Final Order,” that the tissue paper was covered by the 
Tissue Paper from China AD Order.102 
Subsequently, in Mid-Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 
Commerce’s “mixed media” analysis was again before the Federal 
Circuit, this time in a case involving 50 nails contained in a tool kit, 
alongside screwdrivers, measuring tapes, hammers, screws, tacks and 
hooks.103 In its scope ruling on the AD Order on Nails from China,104 
Commerce applied a (k)(2) analysis, finding that because the quantity 
of nails was small, and the nails were not advertised separate from the 
tool kits, the ultimate expectations of customers would not be to pay 
for the entire tool kits just to get the nails.105 Thus, Commerce 
determined that nails should be excluded from the Order. However, 
the Federal Circuit held that because the “parties agree[d] that the 
merchandise – the nails within the tool kits” were covered by “the 
literal terms of the order,” the appropriate analysis for Commerce to 
conduct was to “proceed to the next step and decide whether the 
inclusion of the merchandise within a mixed media item takes it 
outside the scope of the order.”106 The Court analyzed both the 
language of the scope of the Order, as well as the (k)(1) sources, and 
concluded that there was nothing in either step of analysis “to suggest 
that the literal language of the order should not govern” in the mixed 
media case before it.107 The issue was remanded to Commerce, and in 
the end, Commerce determined to examine the nails themselves, 
without regard for the toolkit. Commerce concluded that they were 
 
101 Id. at 1354. 
102 Id. at 1356-57. 
103 Mid-Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 725 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
104 Notice of Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Steel Nails from the People’s Republic 
of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 44, 961–62 (Aug. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Steel Nails from China]. 
105 See id. 
106 Mid-Continent Nail Corp., 725 F.3d. at 1303. 
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covered by the Order, which the CIT affirmed as consistent with the 
Federal Circuit’s holding.108 
More recently, in Star Pipe Products v. United States, the CIT had 
before it a challenge to Commerce’s scope ruling covering steel 
threaded rod components, which the exporter acknowledged would 
be subject to the AD Order on Steel Threaded Rod from China109 if 
imported alone. The components were packaged in “joint restraint 
kits” that also contained a combination of castings, bolts, bolt nuts, and 
washers.110 In accordance with the analysis set forth in Mid-Continent, 
Commerce first determined that the STR components were 
“presumptively in-scope” based on the plain reading of the scope of 
the Order.111 The Court then found the record evidence did not 
support a determination that presumption of inclusion had been 
overcome by their inclusion in the joint restraint kits.112 The CIT 
upheld Commerce’s determination, noting that Commerce has the 
discretion under the “mixed media kit” analysis to determine the 
“parameters” for deciding what information is necessary to overcome 
a presumption that a product is in-scope, and that in this case, 
Commerce’s determination that the “presumption of inclusion was not 
overcome” was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance 
with law.113 
On the other hand, in the August 2019 decision in Trendium 
Pool Products, Inc. v. United States, the CIT considered, and then 
remanded, Commerce’s application of the Mid-Continent two-step 
analysis in a scope ruling covering pool kits and pool walls which 
contained Corrosion Resistant Steel (“CORE”) from Italy and China.114 
 
108 Mid-Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1289 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2015). 
109 See Certain Steel Threaded Rod from the People’s Republic of China, 74 Fed. Reg. 
17,154 (Apr. 14, 2009). 
110 Star Pipe Products v. United States, 393 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1205 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
July 8, 2019). 
111 Id. at 1211. 
112 Id. 
113 Star Pipe, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 1212-14. 
114 Trendium Pool Products, Inc. v. United States, Slip Op. 19-113 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
Aug. 20, 2019). See also Certain Corrosion-Resistant Steel Products From India, Italy, 
the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan: Amended Final 
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As part of its analysis, Commerce first determined whether the CORE 
included in a larger product item was covered by the literal terms of 
the Orders, and then analyzed whether the component’s inclusion in a 
larger product should result in the component’s exclusion from the 
scope of the Orders, based on the section 225(k) factors. After 
reviewing the mill certificates, technical diagrams, and narrative 
descriptions provided by Trendium, Commerce concluded that the 
individual components of the pool kits fabricated from Italian and 
Chinese CORE fell within the plain language of the scope of the 
Orders. Then, Commerce analyzed whether packaging components 
manufactured from subject CORE in a kit with non-subject 
components would necessarily remove the former from the scope of 
the Orders. Because the Orders did not specify whether the Chinese- 
and Italian-origin CORE components at issue would be subject to the 
Orders when packaged or included with non-subject merchandise, 
Commerce reviewed the (k)(1) sources of information, including the 
petitions and ITC injury reports. Commerce determined, pursuant to 
its analysis of the (k)(1) sources, that it had been contemplated that 
CORE would not cease to be subject merchandise if incorporated into 
larger products for various reasons, and therefore the CORE-
fabricated pool components at issue were: (1) covered by the literal 
scope of the Italian and Chinese Orders, and (2) their inclusion in the 
pool kits did not remove them from the scopes of those Orders.115 
The Court in Trendium disagreed with Commerce’s scope 
ruling. It held that the Orders at issue covered “CORE,” but “not 
finished pool products that are no longer being used as a raw input” 
and that “nothing on the record of the original investigation,” in its 
review of the record evidence, “demonstrates that Petitioners intended 
to include fully finished downstream products as part of the scope of 
the investigation.”116 The Government argued that the plain language 
of the Orders contemplated the type of “further processing” which 
these pool sides went through, but the Court did not agree with that 
interpretation; holding that the processing in this case “transformed” 
the CORE components “from a raw input into a finished product,” 
 
Affirmative Antidumping Determination for India and Taiwan, and Antidumping 
Duty Orders, 81 Fed. Reg. 48,390 (July 25, 2016). 
115 See Trendium at *11-15. 
116 Id. at *9-10. 
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thereby placing the products outside the scope of the CORE Orders.117 
To be clear, the Court did not actually apply a substantial 
transformation test, but concluded that “Trendium’s substantial 
processing … creates a finished product fit only for use in Trendium’s 
pools,” and because “[p]ools are a product that is absent from the plain 
language of the Order,” that processing was “sufficient to bring 
Trendium’s product outside the scope of the Order.”118 
Furthermore, the Court held that Commerce had erred in 
relying on Mid-Continent and conducting the two-step analysis 
explained therein, because, in its assessment, the pool kits and walls 
were not “merely a combination of subject and nonsubject 
merchandise,” (i.e. a “mixed media”), but instead the CORE at issue 
were integrated into pools – singular, unitary items, not appropriately 
analyzed under the Mid-Continent analysis.119 
Both of these holdings make the Trendium analysis interesting 
with respect to the overall case law and practice of scope rulings. First, 
the Court essentially held that before the two-part test of Mid-Content 
can be applied, Commerce must first determine if the components at 
issue have been integrated into the larger merchandise to create a 
product which is unique, and therefore not covered by the scope of the 
Order(s) at issue, or if they are part of a “mixed media,” similar to the 
first step of Commerce’s analysis affirmed by the Federal Circuit in 
Walgreen.120 This interpretation of Walgreen and Mid-Continent 
suggests that the Federal Circuit’s two-step analysis set out in Mid-
Continent did not replace, but merely amended, Commerce’s initial 
mixed media test. 
Second, pursuant to the scope language “any other processing 
that would not otherwise remove the merchandise from the scope of 
the order,” the Court conducted a “substantial processing” analysis, 
and on that basis concluded that the plain meaning did not include the 
merchandise at issue in the Italian and Chinese CORE Orders.121 That 
analysis shared some similarities with Commerce’s substantial 
transformation analysis, but as explained above, the substantial 
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transformation analysis has historically been applied separately from 
a review of the text of a scope, and has been used for purposes of 
determining the country of origin.122 The Court’s consideration and 
factual conclusions with respect to the processing experience of the 
merchandise at issue, to determine if Commerce’s scope ruling was 
consistent with the plain meaning of the scope, appears to be 
unprecedented and unique. The CIT’s detailed analysis of the 
procedures which go into the processing of the product went clearly 
beyond the “plain meaning” of the scope, but the CIT used that 
analysis external of the text of the scope to then return to the text and 
inform its understanding of the “plain meaning” of the text. Such an 
analysis differs from previous interpretive tools or analyses 
considered and applied by the CIT and Federal Circuit, such as the 
usage of certain terms in the trade or previous Commerce 
interpretations of the same or similar language in other Orders.123 
E. Scope Exclusion “Tests” Can Be Difficult to Interpret 
and Apply 
Finally, it is worth noting that a large amount of scope rulings, 
and naturally scope ruling litigation, pertain to scope exclusions. As 
one would expect, foreign exporters and importers request that 
Commerce find their merchandise, which has been determined 
initially at the border by CBP to be subject merchandise, to be non-
subject, excluded merchandise, while petitioners want the opposite – 
for Commerce to clarify that certain products are subject to an Order. 
Such a determination is much more complicated when the exclusion 
language does not explicitly exclude products of definitive sizes and 
dimensions, but instead excludes generalized products that meet 
certain criteria, akin to an exclusion “test.” 
There is no better example than two of the exclusions found in 
the Aluminum Extrusions from China Orders: 
 
122 See id. Commerce never conducted a substantial transformation analysis in the 
underlying case, nor did the Court direct Commerce to conduct one on remand. 
123 See., e.g., Arcelormittal Stainless Belgium v. United States, 694 F.3d 82, 86-7 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
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The scope also excludes finished merchandise 
containing aluminum extrusions as parts that are fully 
and permanently assembled and completed at the time 
of entry, such as finished windows with glass, doors 
with glass or vinyl, picture frames with glass pane and 
backing material, and solar panels. The scope also 
excludes finished goods containing aluminum 
extrusions that are entered unassembled in a “finished 
goods kit.” A finished goods kit is understood to mean 
a packaged combination of parts that contains, at the 
time of importation, all of the necessary parts to fully 
assemble a final finished good and requires no further 
finishing or fabrication, such as cutting or punching, 
and is assembled “as is” into a finished product. An 
imported product will not be considered a “finished 
goods kit” and therefore excluded from the scope of 
the Orders merely by including fasteners such as 
screws, bolts, etc. in the packaging with an aluminum 
extrusion product.124 
These two exclusions, known as the “finished merchandise” 
exclusion and the “finished goods kit” exclusion have been at issue in 
dozens of scope ruling determinations – very likely the most scope 
rulings to date that have ever been issued pursuant to a single scope 
by Commerce. Those scope exclusions have also been the source of a 
large amount of litigation, such as two separate scope rulings 
involving “curtain walls,”125 scope rulings addressing “trim kits” (an 
aesthetic frame around the perimeter of a refrigerator or freezer),126 
 
124 Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China: Antidumping Duty 
Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,650, 30,651 (May 26, 2011); Aluminum Extrusions from the 
People’s Republic of China: Countervailing Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,653, 30,654 
(May 26, 2011). 
125 See, e.g., Yuanda I, 146 F. Supp. 3d at 1331; Yuanda II, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 1209; 
Yuanda III, 918 F.3d at 1355; Yuanda 2015, 776 F.3d at 1351. 
126 See, e.g., Meridian Products, LLC v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2014), aff’d, Meridian Products, LLC. v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 3d 1342 
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2014), reconsidered, 77 F. Supp. 3d 1307 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015), aff’d, 
Meridian Products, LLC. v. United States,145 F. Supp. 3d 1329 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016), 
rev’d and Commerce scope ruling affirmed in Meridian V, 918 F. 3d at 1379-1384. 
2020 AN INSIDE SCOOP ON SCOPES 73 
and scope rulings pertaining to appliance handles.127 Questions that 
Commerce, and at times the courts, have struggled with include, but 
certainly are not limited to: When is a product considered “finished?” 
What is the relevance of non-aluminum fasteners to finished 
merchandise? What makes a product a “fastener?” What does “further 
finishing or fabrication” mean when a finished product is incorporated 
into a different product? Can a door be considered “finished 
merchandise” under the Aluminum Extrusion Orders if it doesn’t have 
glass or vinyl, as expressly articulated, but has a screen instead? What 
does assembly “as is” into a finished product “at the time of 
importation” mean for products that can’t be assembled until after 
importation at a date later than the date of entry? Can products 
shipped on multiple vessels, but all imported under the same entry 
form, be considered excluded under the “finished goods kit” 
exclusion? 
Because there is a wide variety and large quantity of extruded 
aluminum products exported from China to the United States, 
Commerce has spent an extensive amount of time and resources 
analyzing those products, including the processes by which those 
products are manufactured, assembled, sold and exported, to answer 
questions such as these under those two exclusion paragraphs. In 
addition, Commerce and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have also 
spent a great deal of time and resources defending many of those 
determinations in challenges before the CIT and the Federal Circuit. 
The courts have ordered Commerce in several cases to issue remand 
redeterminations providing even more analysis and requesting the 
collection of even more data, resulting in remands which have been at 
times sixty pages or more in length. 
Needless to say, the Aluminum Extrusions from China Orders 
should be seen as a lesson, or perhaps even a “problematic scope 
poster child,” to both petitioners and Commerce. Petitioners should be 
cautious in proposing, and Commerce should continue to discourage, 
 
127 See, e.g., Meridian Products, LLC v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 3d 1306 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2015), remand affirmed, 180 F. Supp. 3d 1283 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016), reversed 
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890 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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generalized “tests” in drafting scope exclusions. The inclusion of such 
tests in scope exclusions can create a large burden not only on 
Commerce, importers and exporters, but also on CBP, DOJ, and the 
courts. On a broader point, it is also a great example of how decisions 
made at the investigation phase can have lasting and real impacts on 
the application and administration of scopes long after the Order has 
been finalized and issued. 
IV. IF MERCHANDISE IS FOUND TO CIRCUMVENT AN AD OR CVD 
ORDER, IT CAN BE DETERMINED TO BE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 
THE ORDER 
In addition to defining the scope and scope rulings, Congress 
provided a provision in the statute to address products which are 
physically outside the scope of an AD or CVD Order, but have been 
used by producers, exporters or importers to circumvent the 
application of the Order. Under section 19 U.S.C. §1677j, titled 
“[p]revention of circumvention of antidumping and countervailing 
duty orders,” the statute address four specific scenarios where even 
though merchandise falls outside the text of the scope, if Commerce 
makes an affirmative circumvention finding, Commerce is permitted 
to find that circumventing merchandise is subject to the Order at issue. 
The four scenarios are: (a) Merchandise completed or assembled in the 
United States; (b) Merchandise completed or assembled in other 
foreign countries; (c) Minor alterations of merchandise; and (d) Later-
developed merchandise. Below are examples of each of these 
circumvention determinations, and a description of how Commerce 
sometimes applies its circumvention determinations on a “country 
wide” basis to prevent future circumvention of an Order.128 
 
128 For three of these circumvention scenarios, Commerce is directed to notify the ITC 
“of the proposed inclusion of such merchandise in such countervailing duty or 
antidumping order or finding,” and “take into account any advice provided by” the 
ITC before making a circumvention determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(e); §§ 1677(a), 
(b), (d). See also 19 C.F.R. 351.225(f)(7). 
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A. Merchandise Completed or Assembled in the United 
States 
The Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, provides that if (a) 
“merchandise sold in the United States is of the same class or kind as 
any other merchandise that is the subject of” an AD or CVD order; (b) 
“such merchandise is completed or assembled in the United states 
from parts or components produced in the foreign country with 
respect to which such order or finding applies”; (c) “the process of 
assembly or completion in the United States is minor or insignificant”; 
and (d) “the value of the parts or components referred to in 
subparagraph (B) is a significant portion of the total value of the 
merchandise,” Commerce “may include within the scope of such order 
or finding the imported parts or components referred to in 
subparagraph (B) that are used in the completion or assembly of the 
merchandise in the United States at any time such order or finding is 
in effect.”129 
To determine if a “process is minor or insignificant” the statute 
provides that Commerce “shall take into account --- (A) the level of 
investment in the United States, (B) the level of research and 
development in the United States, (C) the nature of the production 
process in the United States, (D) the extent of production facilities in 
the United States, and (E) whether the value of the processing 
performed in the United States represents a small proportion of the 
value of the merchandise sold in the United States.”130 
Furthermore, to determine “whether to include parts or 
components” in a CVD or AD order, Commerce is directed to also 
“take into account factors such as – (A) the pattern of trade, including 
sourcing patterns, (B) whether the manufacturer or exporter of the 
parts or components is affiliated with the person who assembles or 
 
129 Prevention of circumvention of antidumping and countervailing duty orders, 19 
U.S.C. § 1677j(a)(1)(A-D)(emphasis added). 
130 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(a)(2). Section 225(g) addresses this analysis, explaining that in 
determining if a process is minor or insignificant, no “single factor” will be 
“controlling,” and “in determining the value of the parts or components purchased 
from affiliated person” or “of processing performed by an affiliated person,” 
Commerce may base that value on the “cost of producing the part or component . . . 
.” 19 C.F.R 351.225(g). 
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completes the merchandise sold in the United States from the parts or 
components produced in the foreign country with respect to which the 
order” applies, and “(C) whether imports into the United States of the 
parts or components produced in such foreign country have increased 
after the initiation of the investigation which resulted in the issuance” 
of the order.131 
An example of merchandise completed or assembled in the 
United States was the importation of unfinished Polyethylene Retail 
Carrier Bags (“PRCBs”) from Taiwan that resembled the in-scope 
merchandise except that they were in a continuous roll such that the 
bottoms were open and they lacked handles.132 Commerce found that 
in the United States, nine-inch bags were cut off the roll, one side was 
heat-sealed, and handles were cut out.133 Commerce determined: 1) 
that the unfinished PRCBs were of the same “class or kind” as the 
subject merchandise; 2) that the merchandise sold in the United States 
was completed from parts or components produced in Taiwan; 3) that 
the process of assembly or completion in the United States was minor 
or insignificant; and 4) that the value of the parts or components 
produced in Taiwan was a significant portion of the total value of the 
merchandise.134 With respect to the “additional factors to consider,” 
Commerce concluded that the record was inconclusive as to a change 
in the pattern of trade, that there was no evidence of affiliation 
between the producers or exporters and those assembling the bags in 
the United States, and that subsequent import volumes did not detract 
from, or support, circumvention findings.135 Accordingly, Commerce 
determined that “imports of unfinished PRCBs from Taiwan are 
circumventing the Order.”136 
 
131 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(a)(3). 
132 Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from Taiwan: Affirmative Final Determination 
of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Order, 79 Fed. Reg. 61056 (Oct. 9, 2014) 
[hereinafter PRCB Final Determination]. 
133 Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from Taiwan: Affirmative Preliminary 
Determination of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Order, 79 Fed. Reg. 31302 
(June 2, 2014), and accompanying Preliminary Decision Memorandum [hereinafter 
PRCB PDM], dated June 2, 2014 (79 ITADOC 31302) (Westlaw). 
134 PRCB PDM, supra note 133, at 3-10. 
135 Id. at 9-10. 
136 PRCB Final Determination, supra note 132, at 61,056. 
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B. Merchandise Completed or Assembled in Other 
Foreign Countries 
Under the second circumvention scenario, the statute provides 
that if (A) “merchandise imported into the United States is of the same 
class or kind as any merchandise produced in a foreign country that is 
the subject of” an AD or CVD order; (B) “before importation in to the 
United States, such imported merchandise is completed or assembled 
in another foreign country from merchandise which (i) is subject to 
such (an) order or finding, or (ii) is produced in the foreign country 
with respect to which such order or finding applies; (C) “the process 
of assembly or completion in the foreign country” is “minor or 
insignificant”; (D) “the value of the merchandise produced in the 
foreign country to which the antidumping duty order applies is a 
significant portion of the total value of the merchandise exported to 
the United States”; and (E) Commerce “determines that action is 
appropriate under this paragraph to prevent evasion of such (an) order 
or finding,” Commerce “may include such imported merchandise 
within the scope of such order or finding at any time such order or 
finding is in effect.”137 
To determine if a “process is minor or insignificant” the statute 
provides that Commerce “shall take into account --- (A) the level of 
investment in the foreign country, (B) the level of research and 
development in the foreign country, (C) the nature of the production 
process in the foreign country, (D) the extent of production facilities in 
the foreign country, and (E) whether the value of the processing 
performed in the foreign country represents a small proportion of the 
value of the merchandise imported into the United States.”138 
Furthermore, to determine “whether to include merchandise 
assembled or completed in a foreign country” in a CVD or AD order, 
Commerce is directed to “take into account factors such as – (A) the 
 
137 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(b)(1)(A)-(E) (emphasis added). 
138 Id. at § 1677j(b)(2); accord 19 C.F.R. 351.225(g), (h) (explaining that in 
determining if a process is minor or insignificant, no “single factor” will be 
“controlling,” and “in determining the value of the parts or components purchased 
from an affiliated person,” or “of processing performed by an affiliated person,” or 
“of processing performed by an affiliated person”). Commerce may base that value on 
the “cost of producing the part or component . . . .” 19 C.F.R 351.225(h). 
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pattern of trade, including sourcing patterns, (B) whether the 
manufacturer or exporter of the merchandise” is “affiliated with the 
person who uses the merchandise” to “assemble or complete in the 
foreign country the merchandise that is subsequently imported into 
the United States,” and “(C) whether imports into the foreign country 
of the merchandise” have “increased after the initiation of the 
investigation which resulted in the issuance” of the Order.139 
An example of this type of circumvention involved Small 
Diameter Graphite Electrodes (“SDGE”) from China.140 At issue was a 
company that took Chinese-manufactured artificial/synthetic graphic 
forms, exported those forms to the United Kingdom, and in the United 
Kingdom those forms were tooled and shaped through additional 
machine processing into SDGEs, which were then exported to the 
United States.141 Commerce determined that (1) the SDGE exported to 
the United States was identical to that covered by the AD Order 
covering SDGE from China; (2) the artificial/synthetic graphic form 
inputs were produced in China, the country subject to the SDGE AD 
Order; (3) the process of assembly or completion occurring in the 
United Kingdom was minor or insignificant in comparison to the 
totality of the production of subject merchandise; (4) the value of the 
processing done to the merchandise in the United Kingdom 
represented a small proportion of the value of the merchandise sold in 
the United States, both quantitatively and qualitatively; and (5) 
Chinese-produced merchandise represented a significant percentage 
of the sales value of the exporter’s United States exports of finished 
merchandise.142 With respect to the “other factors to consider,” 
Commerce concluded that Chinese exports of SDGE to the United 
States had decreased significantly, while United Kingdom exports of 
SDGE to the United States, as well as the exporter’s sourcing of the 
relevant inputs from China, had increased – reflecting a pattern of 
 
139 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(b)(3). 
140 Small Diameter Graphite Electrodes from the People’s Republic of China: 
Affirmative Final Determination of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Order, 
77 Fed. Reg. 47,596 (Aug. 9, 2012) (final admin. review) [hereinafter Graphite 
Electrodes from China]. 
141 Id. at 47,597. 
142 See id. at 47,599. 
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trade that supported a circumvention determination.143 Furthermore, 
Commerce found that although the exporter was not affiliated with 
Chinese producers of artificial graphite rod/unfinished SDGE 
component inputs, there had been a significant increase in the Chinese 
exports of artificial graphite to the United Kingdom.144 Accordingly, 
taking all of the information and factors into consideration, Commerce 
determined that the exporter had circumvented the Chinese AD Order 
on SDGE. 
An interesting legal issue that is unique to circumvention 
based on completion or assembly in third countries is the interaction 
between such a circumvention analysis and Commerce’s country-of-
origin test. For example, in a circumvention inquiry covering certain 
CORE from China, Commerce applied the statutory criteria of 19 
U.S.C. § 1677(b) and concluded that companies which produced hot-
rolled steel (HRS) in China or cold-rolled steel (CRS) in China, and 
then exported that merchandise to Vietnam, and used those inputs in 
the production of CORE in Vietnam, were circumventing the AD and 
CVD orders on CORE from China.145 Exporters argued that because 
Commerce had determined in past cases that the country-of-origin 
changed as a result of the substantial transformation that occurred 
when hot-rolled steel was turned into cold-rolled steel, and that the 
country-of-origin changed as a result of the substantial transformation 
that occurred when cold-rolled steel was galvanized and turned into 
CORE, the resulting CORE constituted Vietnamese merchandise and 
thus the CORE could not be covered by the Chinese CORE Order with 
19 U.S.C. §1677j(b).146 
Commerce explained that it did not disagree that the CRS 
made from the Chinese HRS, and the CORE made from the Chinese 
CRS, would be considered Vietnamese in origin under its country-of-
origin test, but that “(t)he application of a substantial transformation 
analysis by Commerce to a particular scenario does not preclude 
Commerce from also applying an analysis pursuant to” 19 U.S.C. 
 
143 See id. at 47,599-600. 
144 Id. at 47,600. 
145 Certain Corrosion-Resistant Steel Products From the People’s Republic of China: 
Affirmative Final Determination of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty and 
Countervailing Duty Orders, 83 Fed. Reg. 23,895, 23,896 (May 23, 2018). 
146 See id. 
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§1677j(b), “because the two analyses are distinct and have different 
purposes.”147 Citing the Federal Circuit’s analysis in Bell Supply, 
Commerce explained that in fact, “circumvention can only occur if the 
articles are from a country not covered by the relevant AD or CVD 
orders.”148 Indeed, Commerce explained if that were not the case, the 
circumvention provision would be “superfluous,” because if “the 
processing … applied in a third country … did not substantially 
transform the subject merchandise, then the resulting product would 
retain a country-of-origin of the country subject to the order … such 
that the merchandise at issue would still be subject to the order at 
issue,” and if the finished merchandise was “subject to the order, then 
there [would be] no need to engage in an anti-circumvention analysis 
under” section 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(b).149 
In Bell Supply, litigation pertaining to the AD Order on Oil 
Country Tubular Goods from China, the Federal Circuit held in 2018 that 
this interpretation of the law was correct and concluded that “even 
where an article is substantially transformed, Commerce can still find 
that it is subject to an AD or CVD order after conducting a 
circumvention inquiry.”150 The Court explained that the legislative 
history showed that this was Congress’ intent when it implemented 
the third country completion or assembly circumvention provision 
into the statute: 
(L)egislative history indicates that § 1677j can capture 
merchandise that is substantially transformed in third 
countries, which further implies that § 1677j and the 
substantial transformation analysis are not 
coextensive. In the Conference Report accompanying 
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988), Congress 
explained that § 1677j addresses situations where 
 
147 Issues and Decision Memorandum for Anti-Circumvention Inquiries on the 
Antidumping Duty and Countervailing Duty Orders on Certain Cold-Rolled Steel Flat 
Products from the People’s Republic of China, U.S. Dept of Commerce, International 
Trade Administration 14 (May 26, 2018) [hereinafter CORE IDM]. 
148 Id. at 16 (citing Bell Supply, 888 F.3d at 1229 (emphasis added)). 
149 See id. at 16. 
150 Bell Supply, 888 F.3d at 1231. 
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“parts and components ... are sent from the country 
subject to the order to the third country for assembly 
or completion.” H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 600 (1988). 
Likewise, the Statement of Administrative Action 
Accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 
Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994), describes 
how foreign exporters will attempt to “circumvent an 
antidumping duty order by ... [p]urchasing as many 
parts as possible from a third country” and assembling 
them in the United States. H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 893 
(1994). Assembling off-the-shelf electronic components 
may very well create a new product that is “from the 
U.S.” or a third country, but such assembly could still 
be relatively minor and undertaken with the intention 
of evading AD or CVD orders. We believe that § 1677j 
is meant to address these attempts at circumvention, 
not preclude Commerce from making a country of 
origin determination in the first instance.151 
Commerce articulated the differences of these two provisions 
of AD and CVD law succinctly in the CORE from China Circumvention 
Final Determination.152 This description summarizes the purpose of 
the country of origin test, as well as the purpose of the third country 
completed or assembled provision: 
As explained above, substantial transformation is 
focused on whether the input product loses its identity 
and is transformed into a new product having a new 
name, character and use, and thus a new country-of-
origin. In contrast, section 781(b) of the Act focuses on 
the extent of processing applied to subject 
merchandise in a third country and whether such 
processing is minor or insignificant such that 
performing this processing in a third country can 
reasonably be moved across borders, thereby allowing 
parties to change the country of origin and avoid the 
 
151 Id. 
152 See CORE IDM, supra note 147, at 17-18. 
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discipline of an order. There is nothing inherently 
contradictory in finding an input substrate to be 
substantially transformed into a finished product, in 
terms of its physical characteristics and uses, while also 
finding the process of effecting that transformation to 
be minor vis-à-vis the manufacturing process, as a 
whole, for producing the finished product.153 
C. Minor Alterations of Merchandise 
This means of circumvention is described in the statute as 
occurring when the “class or kind of merchandise subject to” an 
investigation, AD Order, or CVD Order has been “altered in form or 
appearance in minor respects (including raw agricultural products 
that have undergone minor processing), whether or not included in 
the same tariff classification.”154 The Federal Circuit has held that the 
“purpose of minor alteration anti-circumvention inquiries is to 
determine whether articles not expressly within the literal scope of a 
duty order may nonetheless be found within its scope as a result of a 
minor alternation to merchandise covered in the investigation.”155 
In the legislative history of this provision, five factors were 
listed that Commerce should consider as part of its analysis: (1) the 
overall physical characteristics of the merchandise; (2) the expectations 
of the ultimate users; (3) the use of the merchandise; (4) the channels 
of marketing of the merchandise; and (5) the cost of any modification 
relative to the total value of the imported products.156 It is Commerce’s 




154 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(c)(1); see also 19 C.F.R 351.225(i) (mirroring the same statutory 
language). 
155 Deacero S.A. DE C.V. v. United States, 817 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
156 Omnibus Trade Act of 1987, S. Fin. Rep. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1987). 
157 The Federal Circuit has held that even if “some quantity” of a product “may have 
been in existence at some time in non-investigated countries,” this fact does “not limit” 
Commerce’s ability to find in a circumvention inquiry that a minor alteration has 
occurred to products which were not “produced in investigated countries at the time 
the petition was filed” in circumvention of an Order. See Deacero, 817 F.3d at 1339. 
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As an example, in a circumvention case pertaining to Steel 
Threaded Rod from China, the scope provided a description of the 
percent of various elements composing the steel thread, stating that 
subject merchandise would not be composed of more than, for 
example, 1.50 percent of silicon, 1.00 percent of copper, or 1.25 percent 
of chromium by weight.158 One producer/exporter was found to be 
exporting steel threaded rod from China containing between 1.25 
percent and 1.45 percent chromium by weight.159 Upon analysis, 
Commerce made the following conclusions: (1) The only differences 
physically between the subject merchandise previously exported by 
the reviewed company and the steel threaded rod at issue was slightly 
higher amounts of chromium, carbon and manganese, and a slightly 
higher tensile strength. There was no evidence, however, that the 
company’s customers had ever requested the change in chemical 
makeup or that the very slight change in tensile strength was ever a 
specification taken into consideration when making the change. (2) 
The purchasers of the steel threaded rod at issue did not expect the 
product to perform differently from subject merchandise. (3) The 
merchandise at issue was used in and for the same manner as the 
subject merchandise. (4) The channels and sales of distribution 
between the merchandise at issue and subject merchandise were 
identical. And (5) the costs of modification to the production of the 
steel threaded rod to increase chromium content were minimal in 
comparison to the overall cost of the merchandise.160 Commerce also 
found that the timing of entries supported a finding of circumvention 
as sales of the steel threaded rod with additional chromium to the 
United States started less than a year after the Steel Threaded Rod from 
China Order was issued.161 Furthermore, Commerce concluded 
communications on the record between the importer and the exporter 
demonstrated that the steel threaded rod at issue “was intended to 
 
158 See Certain Steel Threaded Rod from the People’s Republic of China: Affirmative 
Final Determination of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Order, 78 Fed. Reg. 
12,718, 12,718-19 (Feb. 25, 2013). 
159 See Certain Steel Threaded Rod from the People’s Republic of China: Affirmative 
Preliminary Determination of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Order, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 71,775 (Dec. 4, 2012), and accompanying PDM, dated December 4, 2012 (77 
ITADOC 71776) (Westlaw), at 8 [hereinafter STR PDM]. 
160 STR PDM, supra note 159, at 7-9. 
161 See id. at 9. 
84 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 28 
circumvent the Order.”162 Thus, Commerce determined that the 
“circumstances under which the” steel threaded rod at issue “entered 
the United States provided substantial evidence of circumvention of 
the Order.”163 
D. Later-Developed Merchandise 
The fourth, and final, means of circumvention addressed in the 
statute applies when merchandise is “developed after an investigation 
is initiated.” In determining if the later-developed merchandise should 
be considered “within the scope” of outstanding AD and CVD Orders, 
Commerce is directed to consider whether (A) “the later-developed 
merchandise has the same general physical characteristics as the 
merchandise with respect to which the order was originally issue[d] . 
. . ;” (B) “the expectations of the ultimate purchasers of the later-
developed merchandise are the same as for [the] earlier product;” (C) 
“the ultimate use of the earlier product and the later-developed 
merchandise are the same;” (D) “the later-developed merchandise is 
sold through the same channels of trade as the earlier product,” and 
(E) “the later-developed merchandise is advertised and displayed in a 
manner similar to the earlier product.”164 However, unlike the other 
circumvention scenarios, the statute states Commerce “may not 
exclude a later-developed merchandise from” an AD or CVD Order 
“merely because the merchandise (A) is classified under a tariff 
classification other than that identified in the petition” or Commerce’s 
“prior notices during the proceeding,” or (B) “permits the purchaser 
to perform additional functions, unless such additional functions 
constitute the primary use of the merchandise and the cost of 
additional functions constitute more than a significant proportion of 
the total cost of production of the merchandise.”165 
The legislative history of this provision suggests that Congress 




164 Prevention of Circumvention of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 19 
U.S.C. § 1677j(d)(1)(A-E); see 19 C.F.R 351.225(j) (applying to this provision but 
just referring back to the statutory language). 
165 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(d)(2)(A)-(B). 
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produced as a result of a “significant technological advancement or a 
significant alteration of the merchandise involving commercially 
significant changes.”166 In general, if it was “commercially available” 
at the time an Order was issued, Commerce will not find a product to 
be later-developed. However, if the product at issue was not 
commercially available, but merely existed, at the time the Order was 
issued, one might still consider that product to be later-developed. 
Commerce’s analysis in this regard has been affirmed by the CIT and 
Federal Circuit as in accordance with law.167 Thus, it is Commerce’s 
practice to consider if the product was commercially available at the 
time the Order was issued when applying the later-developed 
circumvention provision. Furthermore, Commerce also examines 
whether the merchandise is “materially different” from merchandise 
that was under consideration at the time of the investigation.168 
For example, in a circumvention determination pertaining to 
the AD Order covering Honey from China, Commerce concluded that 
blends of honey and rice syrup, regardless of the percentage of honey 
that they contained, were later-developed merchandise.169 First, 
Commerce determined that the evidence on the record indicated that 
“blends of honey and rice syrup were not commercially available at 
the time of the investigation.”170 Indeed, evidence on the record 
showed “that the first imports of blends of honey and rice syrup to the 
United States from” China “did not occur until August 2004,” three 
years after the AD Order covering Honey from China was issued.171 
 
166 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 603 (1988), reprinted in 
1988 U.S.C.C.A.A.N. 1547, 1636 (stating that “a later-developed product 
incorporating a new technology that provides additional capability, speed, or functions 
would be covered by the order as long as it has the same basic characteristics and 
uses”). 
167 See Target Corp. v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1375-76 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2008), aff’d Target II, 609 F.3d at 1360. 
168 See Honey from the People’s Republic of China: Affirmative Preliminary 
Determination of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Order, 77 Fed. Reg. 
37,378, 37,379-80 (June 21, 2012) [hereinafter Preliminary Honey Determination]. 
169 See Honey from the People’s Republic of China: Affirmative Final Determination 
of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Order, 77 Fed. Reg. 50,464, 50,464 (Aug. 
21, 2012). 
170 Preliminary Honey Determination, supra note 168, at 37,380. 
171 Id. 
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Next, Commerce determined that while honey blends were 
contemplated by the AD Order, “blends of honey and rice syrup are 
materially different from those blends because they are not made of C-
4 sugars. This difference is important because the percentages present 
in the Order are premised on honey-sugar blends for which the 
percentage of honey and sugar are determinate.”172 
Commerce then turned to the factors listed in the statute and 
after conducting an extensive analysis of each factor, came to the 
following conclusions: (1) “honey and rice syrup blends, regardless of 
the percentage of honey they contain, have the same physical 
characteristics as honey;” (2) “consumers have similar expectations for 
blends of honey and rice syrup regardless of the percentage of honey 
they contain, as well as for pure honey;” (3) “blends of honey and rice 
syrup have the same ultimate uses as honey;” (4) “the channels of trade 
for all ratios of blends of honey and rice syrup are … similar to those 
used for honey;” and (5) “honey and rice syrup blends are advertised 
in the same or similar manner as honey.”173 Thus, in accordance with 
its analysis under 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(d) and its analysis of all of these 
factors on the administrative record, Commerce determined “that 
blends of honey and rice syrup, regardless of the percentage of honey 
they contain,” had circumvented the AD Order and should be treated 
as in-scope merchandise.174 
E. Country-Wide Application 
Neither the statute, nor the regulations, direct Commerce on 
how to implement an affirmative circumvention determination other 
than to state that Commerce will include “such merchandise” in a CVD 
or AD Order.175 As evasion concerns are the fundamental purpose of 
circumvention inquiries,176 Commerce has in recent years determined 
 
172 Id. at 37,381. 
173 Id. at 37,381-83. 
174 Id. at 37,383. 
175 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(e). 
176 The legislative history of the circumvention provisions makes this clear, as it states 
that the purpose of the circumvention statute “is to authorize [Commerce] to apply 
[AD and CVD] orders in such as a way as to prevent circumvention and diversion of 
U.S. law.” Omnibus Trade Act, Report of the Senate Finance Committee, S. Rep. No. 
71, 100th Cong., 1st sess. 100 (1987). It also states that Congress was concerned with 
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in some cases to apply the results of its circumvention determinations 
“country-wide” -- addressing not only the actual models of products 
and specific exporters found to be circumventing an AD or CVD 
Order, but also other exporters and comparable products that might 
be able to essentially circumvent a circumvention determination. For 
example, imagine if Company A circumvented an AD Order on 2 inch, 
3 inch, 4 inch, and 5 inch widgets, by exporting a 1.9-inch widget to the 
United States, and then adding on .1 inches of rubber covering in the 
United States, thereby circumventing the very specifically-described 2 
inch product covered by the order. If Commerce only applied the 
circumvention determination to Company A, and then only to the 1.9 
inch widgets it exported, nothing would stop Company A from later 
doing the same or similar activities to avoid the order on 3, 4, or 5 inch 
widgets. Likewise, if it was only applied to Company A, nothing 
would stop Companies B, C, and D from exporting 1.9-inch widgets 
and adding .1 inch of rubber themselves in the United States in 
circumvention of the Order. Accordingly, it is logical in certain 
circumstances for Commerce to issue a circumvention determination 
that covers all exporters of not only a certain type of merchandise, but 
also comparable merchandise that could otherwise benefit from the 
same type of circumvention. 
In a recent, real-world experience, Commerce applied its 
circumvention determination “country-wide” in proceedings covering 
the Aluminum Extrusions from China AD and CVD Orders.177 A Chinese 
company, which had been previously found to be circumventing those 
Orders in a different case involving similar merchandise completed or 
assembled in the United States, entered into a scheme where it spent 
the time and money to fabricate aluminum extrusion products from 
 
the existence of “loopholes” because such scenarios “seriously undermine the 
effectiveness of the remedies provided by the [AD and CVD] proceedings, and 
frustrated the purposes for which these laws were enacted.” Id. Further, Congress 
indicated it anticipated that Commerce would implement and administer the 
circumvention laws aggressively so that it could “foreclose” those “practices.” Id. 
177 Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative 
Determination of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty and Countervailing Duty 
Orders, and Partial Rescission, 84 Fed. Reg. 39,805, 39,805-06 (Aug. 12, 2019) 
[hereinafter Final Aluminum Circumvention Determination], and accompanying 
Issues and Decision Memorandum, dated July 31, 2019 [hereinafter Aluminum 
Circumvention IDM]. 
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their raw inputs in China. The company then exported those products 
to its affiliate in Vietnam, remelted the aluminum extrusion products 
into other aluminum extrusion products, and either exported the 
merchandise to the United States, declaring the merchandise as 
Vietnamese in origin, or sold the merchandise in billet form to 
unaffiliated Vietnamese producers, who then fabricated extruded 
products from the billets and did the same.178 Commerce found that 
this company was not only one of the largest extruders of aluminum 
in the world, but that it accounted for the largest volume of aluminum 
extrusions exported from China to Vietnam, that Vietnamese imports 
of Chinese aluminum extrusions increased during the period of time 
subject to review, and that the level of investment and research in 
Vietnam was minor compared to the investment in China for the initial 
extruded aluminum.179 It should come as no surprise that Commerce 
determined that this company had circumvented the AD and CVD 
Orders covering Aluminum Extrusions from China through the process 
of assembly or completion in Vietnam.180 
In light of the facts and scheme before it, Commerce 
determined that the application of a country-wide application of this 
circumvention determination was appropriate, concluding that “all 
extruded aluminum from Vietnam produced from aluminum 
previously extruded in China (including billets created from re-melted 
Chinese extrusions)” were covered by the AD and CVD Orders 
covering Aluminum Extrusions from China.181 To enforce such a 
determination, Commerce published certification requirements for 
 
178 Aluminum Circumvention IDM, supra note 177, at 7-8, 11. Commerce in fact had 
issued three affirmative circumvention determinations involving this particular 
company in the past. See id. at n. 21. Interestingly, the former chairman and president 
of this company was indicted in July 2019 by a federal grand jury of smuggling large 
quantities of aluminum into the United States to evade the payment of $1.8 million in 
AD and CVD duties. See Chinese billionaire indicted on charges of skirting U.S. 




179 Aluminum Circumvention IDM, supra note 177, at 9. 
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importers and exporters of aluminum extrusions from Vietnam.182 All 
importers and exporters of aluminum extrusions from Vietnam on or 
after March 5, 2018, are now required to complete and maintain a 
certification that certifies that the exported extrusions were not 
produced from Chinese aluminum extrusions, including billets 
created from re-melted Chinese extrusions.183 In this manner, 
Commerce looked beyond the specific circumventing company and 
products and realized that the nature of the circumvention was such 
that a country-wide application was necessary to effectively address 
the evasion concerns brought to light in this circumvention inquiry. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There are numerous legal and policy issues which pertain to 
the scope of Commerce’s AD and CVD Orders. Whether it is the 
defining of the scope of an Order in an investigation, the issuance of a 
scope ruling following a detailed scope inquiry, or the publishing of a 
circumvention determination in the Federal Register, the laws and 
policies pertaining to the scopes of AD and CVD Orders are interesting 
and somewhat complicated. Accordingly, it is this author’s hope that 
this paper has provided some insight on how these scope-related laws 
and procedures operate. All of the United States’ AD and CVD laws 
should be properly and effectively administered, and as explained 
above, there is nothing more fundamental to the administration and 
enforcement of those laws than a clear, well-written and well-thought-
out scope. Of the numerous “scoops” on Commerce’s scopes described 
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